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want to preserve their level of income or maybe increase it. Furthermore, dependence on income 
generated by money laundering is yet another committing device.34  A country whose level of 
income is dependent on the supply of illegal financial services will be committed to offer those 
services.  Such a country might need to fight vigorously in order to preserve its level of income.  
Countermeasures taken by the international community may urge it to aggressively defend its 
position.  Compare this case with the one of a country whose level of income stems from several 
sources.  The loss generated by the repeal of a policy that attracts capitals of illicit origins will be 
equal to a fraction of the overall income generated by the state.  The incidence of the loss is thus, by 
definition, less severe. 
Dependence on revenues - i.e. the level of expected national benefits - produced by 
money laundering makes an  LFR country a hostage to its own success.  In turn, this hostage-like 
dependence reinforces the bilateral relationship between criminal  and terrorist organisations and 
LFR countries.  The former is exposed to the threat of opportunistic behaviour, but the second is 
exposed to the risk of losing reputation and revenues should it behave opportunistically.  Both 




4.  LAX FINANCIAL REGULATION AND INSTITUTIONS 
Some natural features of certain countries appear to be capable of putting them in an 
advantageous position in comparison with other countries.  The reference to the “natural” character 
of such features should be intended to imply that they are not only the result of a specific choice of 
the LFR country.  It is rather the other way around.  These features are sometimes the result of the 
accidents of history; in some cases they have even been imposed on the LFR country.  Take the 
adoption of a given legal system, which is virtually always the result of the colonisation of the 
country by another country that adopted that system.  The “natural” features of a winning LFR 
country will show a sort of “macro” aspect:  A low crime rate, the lack of natural resources, the 
adoption of a common law regime, for example.35 
However, once these features have put the specific LFR country down the path of 
competition with other LFR centres, a demand will arise for institutions that help the LFR country 
to compete more vigorously.  Competitive pressure will urge the adoption of tools that prove useful 
in the struggle for survival.  Starting from the initial positions, a process of refinement through the 
adoption of newer institutions seems likely.  As this process unravels, “micro” institutional devices 
will be put in place.  Interest groups inside the FLR centre will lobby for complementary 
institutions that increase the value of the existing ones.  The institutional environment inside the 
LFR country will thus be driven, domino- like, by a chain of linked complementary institutions,36 
that will add to the survival value of the overall package. 
The task of newer institutions appears to be twofold.  First, they need to contribute to 
the overall efficiency of the regulation offered to customers of the off-shore.  For example, a strict 
banking secrecy regime, or rules that protects the anonymity of beneficial owners of accounts. 
                                                                 
34  ROMANO, (1993) interprets Delaware’s dependence on income generated by franchise taxes as a pre-committing 
device. 
35  Of course the distinction between “macro” and “micro” institutional devices should not be regarded as one of 
“quality” but rather of “quantity,” and we use it for mere sake of exposition.  With the former we refer to more general 
and profound institutional features, that tend to characterize a given country with respect to another.  By “micro” 
institutional devices, by contrast, we mean rules that have a more detailed character. 
36  The observations in the text are based on GILSON. (2000) 
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Far more interesting for the subject of this paper appears to be, however, the second 
function of these “micro” institutional devices:  Over time, institutional devices that buttress the 
commitment by the LFR centre are likely to materialise. 
How will these pre-committing devices look like?  Anything that limits the ability of the 
LFR country to renege on the agreement with the criminal organisations will do the job.  The 
process of differential survival will select the solutions that serve the pre-committing function.  
While we expect to observe functional convergence, we also expect to observe a diversity within 
these devices, whose spectrum is likely to range from a formal and explicit set of rules, for example 
constitutional rules, to mere norms. 
The most obvious example is a supermajority requirement for the repeal of certain 
pieces of legislation.  A rule that states that banking secrecy regulation can be repealed only upon 
the vote of, say, two thirds of the legislative body makes it more difficult for the LFR country to 
switch course after Criminal or Terrorism has moved.37  A second device could be a provision to the 
effect that repeal or modification of a given piece of regulation requires prior approval by 
organisations representing interests that benefit from regulation sympathetic to money laundering.   
For example, the need to obtain the consensus of the bankers’ association or the bar will 
make it more difficult for LFR country to renege on the agreement.  Financial institutions, lawyers, 
and any other group that makes a business out of the supply of financial services within an 
international money laundering scheme will fiercely lobby against any initiative that undermines the 
credibility of the commitment.  Even a mere customary norm that requires consultations with the 
interest groups involved will do, as long as it increases for LFR country the costs of changing 
course of action and behaving opportunistically. 
To be sure, none of these devices is, in itself, a showstopper.  Any rule that aims at 
making the procedure more cumbersome might be repealed thus allowing for the subsequent repeal 
of the pro-money laundering rule.  Take a procedural rule that requires consultations to be held 
before any modification of rules concerning the financial system may be approved.  In anticipation 
that the financial sector will oppose a change in the regulation that would imply an opportunistic 
switch, the legislative might first vote to repeal the procedural requirement, and then move on to 
approve the modification of the regulation. Yet, such a procedure is on its face cumbersome itself.  
The rule still reaches the goal of increasing the costs of an ex post opportunistic switch, thus helping 
to fortify the credibility of the commitment. 
A last remark: the contractual relation between LFC countries and Criminal or Terrorist 
is governed, in the first place by the regulation put in place by LFR country.  In a world of bounded 
rationality, however, contracts are hopelessly incomplete.  The implicit contract stipulated by LFC 
country and Criminal or Terrorist is no exception.  The regulation cannot specify ex ante all future 
contingencies.  Gaps in contracts are always inescapable, but in the setting we are concerned with 
the problem appears to be exacerbated by the possibility that one party to the exchange might not 
reveal all relevant information to the other.  The illicit nature of the capitals involved appears to 
create an incentive for Criminal (Terrorist) to hide some information to LFR country.  In fact, there 
may well be instances in which Terrorist or Criminal will have a clear incentive to disclose false 
information to LFR country.  Beyond the ordinary incompleteness deriving from the costs necessary 
to write contract clauses,38 there is an increased risk that the contract will suffer from “strategic 
incompleteness.”39 
                                                                 
37  See ROMANO (1993), for the description of a similar provision in Delaware. 
38  On which see WILLIAMSON. (1985) 
39  Strategic incompleteness is explored in AYRES and GARTNER. (1989) 
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Be it the result of transaction costs or of strategic behaviour, less information translates 
into more gaps in the contract.  The need arises for gap filling devices that allow the party to work 
out contingencies that were not provided for at the outset. 
A country that will be able to offer gap filling devices of superior quality will be in an 
advantageous position.  This shifts the focus of attention towards those features of the legal system 
that come under severe pressure when it comes to the ex post governance of unspecified 
contingencies. 
We focus on one specific feature that supports the exchange, i.e. the judicial system.  
The regulation adopted by LFR country fills gaps ex ante, up to the point where the marginal cost 
and benefit of an added rule are equalised.  Remaining gaps will be filled, ex post, by judges.  To be 
sure, the probabilities that a given dispute between illegal organisations and their counterpart inside 
the LFR  centre will go to court might appear low, and indeed it seems reasonable to assume so.  At 
the same time, however, the huge amounts of capitals at stake implies that even with a low 
probability of a dispute actually going to court, an efficient judiciary might still entail for the parties 
a high present value.  An efficient judiciary works as a last resort mechanism, capable of generating 
positive externalities on ongoing relations, regardless of whether they actually go to court. 
Keeping the quality of regulation constant, therefore, the package that will include the 
most efficient judicial system will tend to prevail in the competition.  
The importance of the judicial power in ensuring the success of an LFR country appears 
underscored also from a different perspective.  The need to fill gaps ex post does not necessarily 
imply that the gap filling function has to be entrusted to judges.  At a purely theoretical level, LFR 
countries could chose to allocate the gap filling function in the same decisional center responsible 
for the adoption of the regulation.  This solution would probably be infeasible for very practical 
reasons.  When the decision making agent that has written the regulation in the first place is a 
collective body, say a parliament, entrusting in it the gap filling function would be very 
impractical. 40  But assume arguendo that the ex ante and ex post gap filling functions are joined.  
Problems of opportunism aside, this might imply greater familiarity with the issues involved and 
therefore a higher probability that gaps will be filled in a way consistent with the interest of both 
parties.  By contrast, this advantage is partially lost if the function to decide ex post what the parties 
involved would have wanted is shifted to a third party. 
Putting the threat of opportunistic behaviour back in the picture, however, reveals 
another advantage of an efficient judiciary.  An increased role of judges in filling gaps can also be 
thought of as one more tool in the “pre-committing” package that a country offers to potential 
customers.  Assigning the task to fill the gaps in the incomplete contract to a judge might also serve 
another function:  À la Madison, 41 fragmenting the powers among many decision making agents 
helps to ensure that none of them will be able to abuse those powers.  An opportunistic switch by 
the legislative body is likely to require validation by the judiciary.  The country that strictly 
separates the ex ante from the ex post gap filling function will make its commitment more 
credible.42  
 
                                                                 
40 Every dispute should be examined by a structure whose decision making costs are high, especially if compared with 
those borne by a single decision making agent, say a judge.  The latter can ensure a much higher speed of response, thus 
being able to handle more issues than the former.  Quite obviously, the mere circumstance that in the real world the task 
to resolve disputes ex post the exchange is indeed entrusted in third parties shows that different solutions would be 
impracticable. 
41  See the famous The Federalist n. 10, MADISON. (1787) 
42  This observation obviously paves the way for questions concerning the procedures with which judges are appointed 
and the possible effects of the procedure on the incentive structure of the judge.  For example, life tenure is likely to 
produce different results from a three year term with the possibility of being appointed again. 
